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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to examine the roles of independent members on the board and CEO 
duality on firm performance in Malaysia. Data on 40 Malaysian plantation companies 
over 2007 and 2010 are used. The result shows that independent directors may not fully 
understand the operations of their firms since they might not be fully involved in business 
activities. The findings indicate that a dual leadership structure is more effective with larger 
board sizes and longer years of operation. In the context of Malaysian plantations, firms 
should balance their number of outsiders and adopt a CEO duality structure in order to be 
competitive in facing external threats. 
JEL classification: G34
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INTRODUCTION
Investors and other stakeholders in 
corporations have begun to discover the 
importance of good corporate governance 
practices in protecting their interests 
(Ehikioya, 2009). Before making any 
investment in a company, investors look into 
the governance practices of the company 
and the structure of the board of directors 
as good corporate governance can enhance 
a firm’s performance and increase its access 
to outside capital (Abdullah, 2004). Poorly 
governed firms find it difficult to attract 
capital investment from investors for their 
business expansion. Such firms are likely 
to suffer higher bankruptcy risks, lower 
valuations, less profit and less investment 
return to shareholders (Kyereboah-Coleman 
& Biekpe, 2006). Board members of such 
firms have been criticised for the decrease 
in shareholders’ wealth and the failure of 
the firms. These firms might be associated 
with fraud cases such as WorldCom and 
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Enron (Uadiale, 2010), where the board of 
directors failed to be vigilant in exercising 
oversight ability by assigning control 
power to managers who pursue their self-
interest and fail in their accountability to 
shareholders. 
Although many research studies have 
been carried out in the area of corporate 
governance, there are confusing results with 
regards to the effect of CEO duality and 
board composition on firm performance. 
Many developing or emerging market 
countries are not obtaining full and effective 
corporate governance support from the 
private sector (Samada, 2010) as the 
enforcement capacities are not yet fully 
developed due to the legal and regulatory 
systems. Malaysia is no exception. Unlike 
developed countries, Malaysia’s legal and 
regulatory system is not as well established 
nor as well regulated(Gregory & Simms, 
1999). Therefore, the prior study findings 
might not be applicable in the Malaysian 
context.
An Overview of Corporate Governance in 
Malaysia
Corporate governance is always in operation 
but it lacks clear definition (Abidin & 
Ahmad, 2007). Corporate governance is 
also always used to explain the structures 
and processes used to direct and manage 
business activities (Mustapja & Ahamd, 
2011). According to the agency theory, 
outside or independent directors are in a 
better position to monitor management 
as they are assumed to be independent 
members not employed by the firm such 
as are its managers. The separation of 
Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) provides higher transparency and 
accountability to firm information and 
decisions (Kroll et al., 2008). In contrast, 
the stewardship theory proposes that the 
board of directors should be dominated by 
executives or insider members in order for 
effective decisions to be made. The CEO 
and chairman positions should be combined 
in order to strengthen the leadership of the 
company (Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2009).
In the 1990s, Malaysia began to reform 
its corporate governance in order to develop 
better governance in monitoring firms with 
the purpose of enhancing transparency 
and accountability for the management of 
companies. The Asian financial crisis of 
1997/98 brought to Malaysian government’s 
attention the fact of weak corporate 
governance, which was the primary factor 
behind the crisis (Zulkafli et al., 2006). 
In 2000, the government launched the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG), which was fully implemented in 
2001 (Mustpha & Ahamd, 2011). The code 
was gradually enforced on public-listed 
firms in Bursa Malaysia. 
However, MCCG was again revised 
by the Malaysia Securities Commission 
with more stringent international standards 
effective as of 1 October 2007 (Johari 
et al., 2008). The code proposes that the 
board of directors of a company should 
include independent directors numbering 
at least one third of the total board and that 
there must be clear separation of duties 
between the chairman and the CEO. Firms 
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in which the roles of chairman and CEO are 
combined have to publicly announce the fact 
and explain the need for it in their annual 
report (Securities Commission, 2007). 
In 2000, the Code of Malaysian 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) was first 
issued. However, many scholars claim 
that the existing governance mechanisms 
lackeffective control over managerial 
behaviour (Khoo, 2003). Most listed 
companies have disclosed their corporate 
governance information according to their 
own format (Rachagan, 2010). Besides, 
many studies also focus on large firms in 
developed countries with very few studies 
having been conducted in developing 
countries such as Malaysia (Muhamad et 
al., 2005), especially studies related to the 
plantation industry.
Board Composition and Firm 
Performance
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that the board 
of directors plays a vital role in corporate 
governance. There are two types of board 
of directors, namely, insiders and outsiders. 
Some prior studies suggest the board of 
directors should consist of independent 
members i.e. non-executive and outside 
directors (Johari et al., 2008). It may help 
to reduce the agency problem by controlling 
and monitoring the opportunistic behaviour 
of management (Meckling, 1976 cited in 
Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).
Dehaene et  al .  (2001)  use  122 
Belgian listed companies to test the link 
between governance mechanism (board 
independence and CEO duality) and firm 
performance (ROE and ROA). The result 
presented significant positive relationship 
between board independence and ROE, 
implying the higher the percentage of 
outside director, the better the performance. 
The study of Kyereboah-Coleman and 
Biekpe (2006) find an insignificantly 
negative link between outside directors, 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. Ehikioya (2009) 
finds no association between board 
composition and performance. Weir et al., 
(2002) documents no significant association 
between independent board composition and 
accounting based measure of performance. 
Using Tobin’s Q, the findings from Yermarch 
(1996) and Ehikioya (2009) indicate a 
significant relationship between board 
composition and performance. 
Based on Bhagat and Black’s (2002) 
findings, there was no relationship between 
non-executive director and Tobin’s Q. 
Kajola (2008) shows that there is no relation 
between ROE and board composition, 
implying an insignificant impact of the 
boards of outside directors on the firms’ 
financial performances. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) point out that too many 
outsiders on the board will not help to 
increase firm performance due to political 
reasons. Moreover, Ibrahim and Samad 
(2011) find no significant link in proportion 
of independent directors to performance 
as measured by ROE and Tobin’s Q. The 
weak link between outside directors and 
performance indicated that outside directors 
cannot enhance potential value to the firms 
(Rashid et al., 2010; Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006). To conclude, the prior studies’ 
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findings on the impact of independent non-
executives are mixed. 
CEO Duality and Firm Performance
The CEO is a full-time employee who holds 
the responsibility for the daily running of the 
firm as well as for setting and implementing 
corporate strategies. The chairperson leads 
the board of directors to ensure that the 
board performs effectively and he holds the 
responsibility for monitoring and evaluating 
the performance of the executive directors, 
including the CEO. A dual position does 
not separate the positions of chairman 
and CEO (Petra, 2005). The CEO takes 
responsibilities as chairman such as setting 
meeting agenda, running meetings of 
the board and overseeing the processes 
of compensation. Obviously, a potential 
conflict of interest arises when there is CEO 
duality (Petra, 2005). Higgs (2002) suggests 
both roles should not be combined due to 
the fact that a dual position affects the firm 
performance adversely (Chen et al., 2005).
Among others, Pi and Timme (1993) 
and Rechner and Dalton (1991) suggest 
that firms with a dual leadership structure 
have a higher ROE. Consistently, Dehaene 
et al. (2001) find a significant positive link 
between CEO duality and ROA. However, 
according to Ehikioya’s (2009) study, the 
CEO duality has a significant adverse impact 
on performance, measured as ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 
(2006) find a negative correlation between 
thedual position and Tobin’s Q and ROA but 
both are insignificant. Ibrahim and Samad 
(2011) suggest that if different persons held 
the separate positions of CEO and Chairman 
as suggested by the MCCG (revised 20007), 
then the firm’s performance would improve.
Moreover, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
state that there is no relationship between 
CEO duality and performance as measured 
by Tobin’s Q while it is significantly 
inversely related to ROA. Kajola’s (2008) 
study finds that there is a significant 
relationship between ROE and CEO duality 
but there is no relation between ROE and 
board composition. This is supported 
by Baliga et al. (1996) who also find no 
significant relationship between duality and 
firm performance. To conclude, the results 
of prior studies are inconsistent and mixed.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
The plantation industry was selected as 
the research context because it makes 
a substantial contribution to economic 
growth under the Malaysian Economic 
Transformation Programme (ETP ) (Tan, 
2011). Malaysia’s palm oil export is one 
of the largest contributors to the Malaysian 
economy today, amounting to RM1.889 
(8 %) of the country’s GNI per capital 
(PEMANDU, 2010). The rubber industry, 
on the other hand, only contributed RM18.5 
billion to the country’s GNI in 2009;it is 
the second main commodity crop after oil 
palm (PEMANDU, 2010). Therefore, the 
plantation industry is selected as the focus 
of this study with regards to its potential 
growth in Malaysia in the future. This study 
aims to examine the relationship among 
independent board composition, CEO 
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duality and firm performance. The findings 
of this study are expected to provide an in-
depth knowledge of corporate governance in 
the plantation industry by filling in the gap 
in the literature on corporate governance and 
it is also expected to benefit organisational 
stakeholders such as managers, investors, 
the government and customers in terms of 
theoretical and managerial significance. 
The data was collected using secondary 
data including each company’s annual 
report and its official website as well 
as DataStream. Such data was obtained 
manually by calculating the number of 
directors on the board (Board Size) in order 
to determine the number of independent 
non-executive/outside director on the board 
(Ibrahim & Samad, 2011) and also the dual 
position of chairman and CEO in the years 
from 2007 to 2010, making up a total of 41 
listed plantation companies. Firms that were 
newly listed after 31 December 2007 or that 
were delisted from the Main Board were 
excluded. This study also excluded firms 
which failed to comply with any obligations 
under Practice Notes No 4 (PN4) and No 
17 (PN 17). PN4 was also amended to PN 
17 effective as of January, 2005 (Ibrahim 
& Samad, 2011). At the same time, the 
firm’s accounting period must have fully 
completed 12 months’ of operation for the 
business year and should be in line with the 
same end of year over a four-year period 
(Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). This study also 
included firms that changed the name of the 
company during the study period. In total, 
there were 40 firms meeting the criteria with 
only one PN17 firm having to be dropped.
Methodology
This study utilised the multiple regression 
technique to determine the relationship 
among board composition, CEO duality 
and firm performance as follows.
0 1 21 2it it itY X Xβ β β= + +
3 4 353 4 5it it itX X Xβ β β+ + +
6 7 86 7 8it it it itX X X eβ β β+ + + +
Where 
Yit = Return on Asset (ROA) or 
  Return on Equity (ROE) or 
  Tobin’s Q
β0 = Constant
βj = Coefficient of the explanatory 
  variable, with j =1,2….8
X1it = CEO Duality (CD)
X2it = Board Composition (BC)
X3it = Board Size (BSize)
X4it = Firm Size (FSize)
X5it = Firm Age (FAge)
X6it = Firm Growth (Growth)
X7it = Total Debt to Total Assets  
  (Debt 1)
X8it = Total Debt to Total Equity  
  (Debt 2)
eit = Error term
It is important to state that this study 
adopts two accounting performance 
measures (ROA and ROA) and a market 
performance measure (Tobin’s Q) to measure 
the performance of the firm. A summary of 
the terms of variables is presented in Table 1.
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Descriptive Analysis 
The statistics in Table 2 indicate that the 
majority of listed plantation firms (90 %) 
are engaged in the oil palm business in 
Malaysia due to the increasing demand for 
edible oils and animal proteins under oil 
crop cultivation, particularly oil palm, in 
the last few decades. Today, palm oil is the 
most widely traded edible oil. Its production 
has increased almost twice since the 1990s. 
As shown in Table 3, the majority 
of listed firms (80 %) have 6 to 9 board 
TABLE 1 
Summary of Terms of Variables
Variables Acronym Terms of Measurement
Dependent
Return on Assets ROA Profit before interest and tax payment
Total assets
Kyereboad-Coleman and Biekpe (2006); Haniffa and Hudaib (2006)
Return on Equity ROE Total Profit after Interest and Tax Payment
Total Equity
Kyereboad-Coleman and Biekpe (2006); Kajola (2008)
Tobin’s Q ratio Q-Ratio Market Value of Equity Capital + Book Value of Debt
Book Value of Total Assets
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006); Ehikioya (2009), 
Note: Book values of total assets should not differ markedly from 
replacement cost due to reasonably frequent updating of book values to 
reflect market values (Black et al., 2006)
Independent
CEO duality CD Dummy variable: (1) CEO combined as the chairman
                             (0) Otherwise
Abdullah (2004); Johari et al. (2008); Kajola (2008); Ehikioya (2009) 
Board 
Composition (%)
BC Number of outside directors
Total number of directors (Board Size)
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006); Kajola (2008)
Control
Board Size BSIZE Natural Logarithms of Total Board Members
Jackling and Johl (2009); Arosa et al. (2010)
Firm Size FSIZE Natural Logarithms of Total Assets
Arosa et al. (2010)
Firm Age FAGE Natural Logarithms of the number of years firm was incorporated
Wang (2006);Barontini and Caprio (2006); Arosa et al. (2010)
Growth (%) GROWTH Current Year’s Revenue-Last Year’s Revenue
Last Year’s Revenue
Wang (2006); Barontini and Caprio (2006); Arosa et al. (2010)
Debt 1 DEBT 1 Total Liability
Total Assets
Masheyekhi and Bazaz (2008); Rashid et al. (2010)
Debt 2 DEBT 2 Total Liability
Total Equity
Wang and Oliver (2009); Rashid et al. (2010)
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members. The Code of Malaysia corporate 
governance does not limit the number 
of directors on a board but Abduallah 
(2004) argues that broad size should be 8 
to 9 persons for the board to be effective. 
Table 4 presents 90 % of the listed firms 
that have 2 to 5independent directors. 
The MCCG requires at least two or one 
third of the company’s board members to 
be independent directors. Hence, listed 
plantation firms mostly comply with the 
MCCG.
Table 4 presents the descriptive analysis 
of the 40 companies in the sample. For the 
dependent variables, the mean of ROA, 
ROE and Q-ratio is about 9.8 %, 9.4 % and 
0.857. The Q value is near to 1, implying 
that on average, the firms are perceived to 
be valuable for shareholders (Khatab et al., 
2011). The majority of the firms comply 
with the provisions of the MCCG and the 
listing of Bursa Malaysia as the mean of 
board composition is about 5 %, which 
requires that more than two or one third of 
the members should be independent non-
executive directors on the board. Almost 
20.6 % of the sampled firms have one 
person holding the dual position of CEO 
and Chairman while 79.4 % of the firms 
have different individuals holding the 
posts of CEO and Chairman. Hence, it can 
be argued that the MCCG (revised 2007) 
recommendation for the separation of the 
CEO and Chairman posts has been complied 
with by the majority of the listed firms in the 
plantation sector. However, this percentage 
is lower compared with the study of Abidin 
et al. (2009) which finds that 29.3 % of the 
selected sample practices CEO duality. 
The mean of the board size is about 8 
directors, ranging from minimum 4 directors 
to maximum 13 directors. This result fulfils 
the board size requirement that there should 
be 8 or 9 persons on the board in order for 
TABLE 2 
Core Business of Sampled Firms
Business Activity Percentage (%) Number of Company
Oil Palm 90.0 36
Oil Palm and Rubber 5.0 2
Oil Palm and Cocoa 2.5 1
Oil Palm, Coconut and Banana 2.5 1
Total 100.0 40
TABLE 3 
Number of Directors on the Board and Number of Independent Directors
No. of Persons No. of Directors on Board No. of Independent Directors
Percentage (%) Number of Company Percentage (%) Number of Company
2-5 persons
6-9 persons
10-13 persons
7.5
80.0
12.5
3
32
5
90
10
0
36
4
0
Total 100.0 40 100.0 40
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it to be effective (Abdullah, 2004). The 
mean of firm size is around RM88,900,000 
ranging from minimum RM280,825 to 
maximum RM11,859,088,000. The average 
operating years of the firms is 28.82 years. 
Firm growth ranges from100 % to 898 % 
with a mean of 31.8 %, implying that some 
of the firms are growing faster while others 
tend to be at default. The average of total 
debt to total assets (debt 1) is 21.9 %, which 
indicates that merely 20 % of the assets are 
financed by debt whereas the mean of total 
debt to total equity (debt 2) is 79.3 %. Firm 
growth ranges from100 % to 898 % with a 
mean of 31.8 %, implying that some of the 
firms are growing at a faster speed while 
others tend to be at default.
The results shown in Table 6 indicates 
that the Tolerance and VIF values are well 
below the cut-off points for determining 
the presence of multi-collinearity, thus 
suggesting no multi-collinearity problems 
with cross correlation. 
TABLE 5 
Collinearity Statistics
Variables Tolerance VIF
(Constant)
BC 0.823 1.215
CD 0.790 1.266
BSIZE(log) 0.592 1.690
FSIZE (log) 0.789 1.268
FAGE 0.678 1.476
GROWTH 0.832 1.202
DEBT 1 0.675 1.120
DEBT 2 0.781 1.365
Regression Analysis 
Table 6 presents the result of regression 
analysis by performing the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression in this study. The 
R-squares for ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q 
are 10 %, 15.97 and 20.4 % respectively. 
Of these three models, none of the board 
composition and CEO duality show a 
significant relationship with ROA and ROA 
respectively. The overall significance level 
of Tobin’s Q model is higher and the board 
composition and dual CEO are significant. 
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Independent, Dependent and Control Variables
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median Mode Standard Deviation
ROA -0.165 1.262 0.098 0.068 -0.165 0.133
ROE -0.168 0.471 0.094 0.078 -0.168 0.986
Q-Ratio 0.194 3.557 0.856 0.714 0.194 0.694
BC 0.167 0.857 0.497 0.444 0.333 0.168
CD 0.000 1.000 0.206 0.000 0.000 0.406
BSIZE (log) 0.600 1.110 0.863 0.845 0.780 0.105
FSIZE (log) 5.448 10.074 8.007 8.470 5.448 1.280
FAGE (log) 0.301 1.973 8.467 1.362 1.342 0.331
GROWTH -1.0 8.980 0.318 0.077 0.000 1.808
DEBT 1 0.001 1.00 0.219 0.147 0.001 0.206
DEBT 2 0.001 3.235 0.793 0.497 0.001 0.794
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Independent board composition is 
statistically negatively correlated with 
Tobin’s Q with a t-value of -0.670. This 
suggests that independent directors do not 
necessarily have a positive association with 
firm performance if they do not play their 
role properly. If the board is dominated by 
a large number of independent directors, 
poor investment decisions may result such 
as investing in undervalued projects. CEO 
duality is positively significant with Tobin’s 
Q, consistent with Yermarck (1996) but not 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Ehikioya 
(2009). A firm can perform well under dual 
leadership as CEO duality would lead to 
better knowledge and understanding of the 
firm’s operation and environment, allowing 
the firm to make a better investment decision. 
He or she is not only responsible for the 
running of the firm’s operation but also the 
running of the board.
CONCLUSION
This study aims to examine the relationship 
between governance mechanisms (i.e. 
independent board and CEO duality) and 
firm performance in the plantation sector in 
the period from 2007 to 2010 by using both 
accounting and market-based performance 
measures. The majority of the listed firms 
have 6 to 9 directors. Abdullah (2004) 
states that board size should be 8 or 9 
persons in order for the board to achieve 
effectiveness. In addition, an independent 
board has a negative relationship with firm 
performance. Raheja (2005) argues that 
outside directors are not involved in day-
to-day management while inside directors 
have a greater knowledge of the firm. 
According to Abdullah (2004), independent 
directors might not be truly independent 
while they may have connections in unlisted 
subsidiaries. The results also recommend 
that listed firms should balance their number 
TABLE 6 
Factors Affecting Firm Performance in the Plantation Industry, 2007-2010
Variables ROA ROE Tobin’s Q ratio
Coefficient t-value Sig. Coefficient t-value Sig. Coefficient t-value Sig.
BC -0.040 -0.059 0.555 -0.027 -0.561 0.575 -0.670 -2.014 0.046
CD -0.028 -1.079 0.282 -0.024 -1.262 0.209 0.395 3.063 0.003
BSIZE (log) 0.154 1.488 0.139 0.132 1.782 0.077 -0.653 -1.287 0.200
FSIZE (log) -0.004 -0.541 0.589 -0.002 -0.416 0.678 -0.021 -0.520 0.604
FAGE (log) 0.031 0.991 0.324 0.027 1.211 0.228 -0.067 -.0431 0.667
GROWTH 0.026 2.755 0.007 0.029 4.307 0.000 0.040 -0.843 0.401
DEBT 1 -0.107 -1.273 0.205 -0.118 -1.976 0.050 2.092 5.099 0.000
DEBT 2 0.000 -0.043 0.966 0.030 1.925 0.056 -0.503 -4.722 0.000
R2 = 0.100
Adjusted R2 = 0.052
F value = 2.088
F significance = 0.040
R2 = 0.159
Adjusted R2 = 0.115
F value = 3.575
F significance = 0.001
R2 = 0.204
Adjusted R2 = 0.162
F value = 4.848
F significance = 0.000
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of independent directors on the board 
of directors. On the other hand, CEO 
duality has a positive relationship with 
firm performance as suggested by the 
stewardship theory. It can be interpreted 
that a firm can perform well under a dual 
leadership structure even though the MCCG 
recommends that the dual position should be 
avoided The CEO and chairman positions 
should be combined rather than separated as 
such a merging can strengthen the leadership 
of a company (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 
2009). Baliga et al. (1996) suggests that a 
non-dual leadership structure would limit 
innovation, and Davis et al. (1997) believe 
that a dual leadership structure can help 
listed companies to achieve leadership 
that is unambiguous and strong in order to 
achieve internal efficiency through unity of 
command; to remove potential for conflict 
between the chairman and CEO; and also 
to avoid confusion as a result ofhaving two 
different public spokespersons. 
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